3-GORBACHEV+Myers,+Taylor

__The Media under Glasnost in Soviet Russia__ > > propaganda’. The term distinguishes press and broadcasting from those elements of the > > cultural apparatus which depend on interpersonal communication for the transmission of > > messages – the oral propaganda network, the education system, and the ‘knowledge’ > > societies.1 > > It also alerts us to the Party’s insistence that the Soviet media should function > > as engines of ideological production; machinery of social knowledge, to be harnessed and > > consciously directed to solving the tasks of socialist construction. > > The straightforward instrumentalism of this approach contrasts with that prevailing in > > liberal democracies such as Britain and the United States of America, where the > > independent, impartial, ‘watchdog’ role of journalism is held to be paramount. In these > > countries critical theorists have long questioned the independence of the media and > > debated the extent to which news and journalism should be considered as part of the > > ‘ideological apparatus of the state’. 2 > > In the USSR, as any Soviet journalist will readily > > concede, ‘we make no bones about it’. 3 > > The Party, speaking in the name of the people, > > openly proclaims the fact that since 1917 it has used the Soviet news media as a means of > > social control and engineering, rather than of communicating useful information for its > > own sake. As one Soviet source puts it, ‘mass media under socialism not only express > > public opinion, they are the most important means of its formation’ (Korobeinikov, ed., > > 1986, p.52). > > Acting on this belief, the Bolsheviks after 1917 built a media apparatus unequalled in > > size and complexity anywhere in the world. Moreover, the Party took upon itself the role > > of supervision and control of this apparatus. By gradually outlawing the great majority of > > non-Bolshevik media organs the Party effectively monopolised the flow of mass > > information in Soviet society for nearly seventy years. With the exception of those few > > who had access to alternative sources—principally foreign radio stations run by western > > broadcasting and intelligence services, and underground ‘samizdat’ publications 4 > > —the Soviet citizen was throughout this period almost completely dependent on official media > > for information. > > ‘positive’ and ‘critical’ dimensions of glasnost as defined by Lenin. While the > > propagandising of positive economic and social phenomena remains an important > > function of the Soviet media, they are now called upon to engage in genuine criticism and > > self-criticism. > > The first blow for ‘critical’ glasnost was struck by an article published in Pravda on > > February 13th, 1986, concerned with the sensitive issue of Party privilege. The article > > quoted reader N.Nikolayev of Kazan, who wrote that > > Glasnost, perestroika and the soviet media 44in discussing social justice, one cannot close one’s eyes to the fact that > > Party, Soviet, trade union, economic, and even Young Communist League > > officials sometimes objectively deepen social inequality, taking advantage > > of all sorts of special refreshment bars, special stores, special hospitals, > > etc. Yes, there is socialism in our country, and everyone should receive > > according to his work. Let it be so, without wage-levelling. An official has > > higher earnings in monetary terms. But in other respects there should be > > no privilege. Let a director join everyone else in going to an ordinary store > > and standing in line—perhaps then the lines that everyone is sick of would > > be eliminated more quickly. > > the economy, but to the past history of Soviet society. As already noted, the Soviet media > > have traditionally functioned as ‘collective propagandists and agitators’, a role in which > > the mass dissemination of historical knowledge has been central. Before the glasnost > > campaign, control of history was one of the most important aspects of the Party’s > > ideological work. > > If anything could be said to have been genuinely Orwellian about Soviet society > > before 1985 it is the manner in which history was continually rewritten in accordance > > with the interests of successive Party leaderships. The media, in common with other > > branches of the cultural apparatus, were required to propagate a selective, distorted and > > frequently dishonest account of history, from which all facts contrary to the Party’s > > authorised version of events were expunged. One of the major achievements of the > > glasnost campaign has been to put an end to this approach to the past and allow the > > beginning of a process of reclaiming Soviet history. > > The ‘new history’ has focused on the demystification of Stalinism through the full or > > partial rehabilitation of his victims, including hitherto persona non grata such as > > Bukharin, Tukachevsky and, to a limited extent, even Trotsky. This has necessitated > > Glasnost, perestroika and soviet journalism 51extensive publicity about the crimes committed during Stalin’s rule, going far beyond the > > revelations made by Khrushchev at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956. > > rights of access to information. Onikov recalls that for Lenin glasnost meant ‘free, > > unrestricted access to any unclassified documents and materials connected with the work > > of soviets, executive committees, and services’.1 > > Consequently, he argues, Soviet citizens > > and their organisations should be granted access to all unclassified information necessary > > for their participation in political and administrative decision-making, such as detailed > > and accurate statistics, copies of draft legislation, discussion documents and records of > > the proceedings of decision-making bodies. This would not necessitate the publication of > > all such information, he points out, since ‘it is obvious that to inform about absolutely > > everything is impossible, and is scarcely necessary if everyone has the right to acquaint > > themselves with all unclassified knowledge’. Rather, lists of unclassified information > > could be made available, with details of how access can be gained to it. Alternatively, a > > list of classified, secret information would be published on the assumption that ‘what is > > not forbidden, is permitted’. > > To illustrate what such access would mean in practice Onikov cites the experience of > > the 1920s, before the influence of Stalinism had properly begun to be felt, and when ‘the > > principle of glasnost was more widely used in Party life than at any other time in CPSU > > history’. At this time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party made available a > > bulletin (Izvestias) containing lists of all published Party and state documents, the titles of > > the press organs in which they first appeared, and their date of publication. This practice > > allowed anyone to become acquainted with interesting documents, without difficulty.’ > > The limits on access to information in contemporary Soviet society would be determined, > > as in capitalist countries, by criteria of national security, individual privacy and > > administrative efficiency >
 * What was the situation for that group/institution before Gorbachev became Premier?**
 * Before the Gorbachev government, the media was seen as an entity to be used for “the means of mass information and propaganda”. therefore the media was a tool to be used by the government, for purposes of conveying ideological factions. The Communist Party openly admits that since 1917, following the Bolshevik Revolution, the government has used the Soviet new as a device for social control and implantation of ideas into the general public. The media was used to create this positive image of the USSR out of the maliciousness it actually held. The Communist Party outlawed any non-Bolshevik media sources following their takeover in 1917, and the USSR maintained that notion until the introduction of glasnost. All media sources were ran by the government and any materials that would shed an unpleasant light upon the government or put the enemies in a good light were censored and kept from the general population. The only sources of media were those run by the government, following the exceptions of those who pursued alternative radio stations ran by Westerners in a “underground” setting.
 * Document: Glasnost Perestroika and The Soviet Media by Brian McNair pg. 1
 * The Soviets refer to their news media as ‘the means of mass information and
 * How did that group/institution interpret the application of those policies to it?**
 * Through the implementation of glasnost, the general public was educated about the past events in Soviet history, therefore they educated about the death purges and other previously covered up materials. Nikita Khrushchev, who was in office before Gorbachev, publicly denounced Stalin’s actions, but did not present the Soviet population with the information about the past like Gorbachev did. Additionally, the true conditions and the prosperity of the other states, most notably the United States, were exposed.
 * o Interpretation: The media and the general public were shocked by the revelations, but the media held a “take it and run” attitude about //glasnost//. They actively spread the negative aspects of life in the Soviet Union, therefore dismantling the previous positive view of Soviet life. Despite the policies, the media lost faith in the Soviet system, and conveyed that message to the general public. There was a feeling of betrayal and hopelessness amongst the people because the foundation of their country was built upon falsities and crimes against humanity.
 * Document: Glasnost, Perestroika, and The Soviet Media by Brian McNair pg. 44-45
 * The first objective of the glasnost campaign has been to restore the balance between the
 * How did the Soviet state apply those policies to that group/institution, and what were**
 * the effects?**
 * The Soviet State relaxed the extreme censorship that was occurring before the Gorbachev government, therefore allowing media sources to freely say what was occurring in the USSR and expose old truths.
 * o Effects: Media exposed severe economic and social inadequacies in the Soviet government that were long denied and covered up. For example, the problems of poor housing, food shortages, rampant alcoholism, widespread pollution, increasing mortality rates, and the Soviet state crimes against the population were coming to the surface. This led to internal calls for independence within the territories of the USSR (Balltics, Ukraine, Georia, Azerbaijan).
 * Relaxation of censorship also allowed the media to create an explosion in pop culture in Russia, as the media and general public were now exposed to the knowledge of the Western world.
 * Effects: Popular Western literature, films, and books on astrology, and religion were shown to the general public through the media, as the state was still unwilling to publish such things.
 * Document: Glasnost, Perestroika, and the Soviet Media by Brain McNair pg. 51-52
 * The principle of critical glasnost has been applied not only to the present-day workings of
 * What was the significance of Gorbachev’s reforms as it pertained to that group/institution?**
 * The media was not allowed to report the truth, in most cases, in the USSR since 1917, therefore the policy of glasnost and the promotion of openness on the behalf of the Soviet government, signaled great change. The people would be allowed to speak their minds without putting their lives at risk (to a certain degree) and the unveiling of the Soviet history led to many great changes. Most notably, the openness of the Soviet government and the allowance of the media to report the truth //and// report the negative aspects of the Soviet Union led to the ideas of uprising by the people in the USSR and the satellite states. Therefore, the openness of the government, although necessary, catalyzed the dissolvement of the Soviet Union.
 * Document: Glasnost, Perestroika, and the Soviet Media pg. 64
 * In the context of the glasnost campaign the extension of access has referred, first, to

Works Cited: "1985: Perestroika and Glasnost." //Perestroika and Glasnost //. N.p., n.d. Web. 02 Mar. 2014.  page=subject&SubjectID=1985perestroika&Year=1985>.

"Gorbachev's Glasnost." //Mikhail and Its Affect on Russia //. N.p., n.d. Web. 02 Mar. 2014. .

McNair, Brian. //Glasnost, Perestroika, and the Soviet Media //. London: Routledge, 1991. Print.