3-GORBACHEV+Purohit,+Nik

**Soviet Military ** Source: F. Stephen Larrabee, “Gorbachev and the Soviet Military”,//Foreign Affairs//, Vol. 66, No. 5, Summer 1988, pp. 1002-1026, published by Council on Foreign Relations
 * Research: Soviet Reform in the Gorbachev Era **
 * **What was the situation for that group/institution before Gorbachev became Premier? **
 * Even before Gorbachev became the Premier, the Soviet Military was crucial to Soviet security and interests under Brezhnev, who was in control prior to Gorbachev. During Brezhnev’s term/period, Soviet defense spending had increased significantly during 1965 to 1975, to the point of being called the “golden age” of the high command, but later spending had slightly decreased between 1977 and 1983, as the transition was made to Gorbachev’s rule. This is because during this time in the late 1970s, Brezhnev’s relations with the military had decreased, thereby causing defense spending to decrease. Brezhnev sought to reallocate money to other sectors of the economy in order to create economic growth (for other causes), however this only fueled public tension, as the Soviet military was not keeping up with the rate of the U.S. military’s growth. In turn, money was reallocated to the military, at the expense of valuable economic growth in other areas of the Soviet economy.
 * Document:



Source: David Holloway, “State, Society, and the Military under Gorbachev”, //International Security//, Vol. 14, No. 3, Winter of 1989-1990, published by The MIT Press
 * **How did that group/institution interpret the application of those policies to it? **
 * During this time, the application of the policies on the Soviet military faced reluctance, as many did not want to decrease military spending meanwhile the U.S. military was growing rapidly. In order to defend Soviet interests and maintain power, many military leaders sought to change Gorbachev’s mind on his policies so that the military wouldn’t be jeopardized. Gorbachev thought that spending on the military was unnecessary because it was not contributing to improving the economy of the Soviet Union. However, the military was more understanding with Gorbachev’s policy of arms control (which decreased the amount of nuclear weapons, ICBMS, ABMs, etc) since it relieved the economy of the burdens from an arms race. Gorbachev wanted to focus more on rebuilding and fixing the economy of the Soviet Union in order to create economic growth. In the end, the military supported Gorbachev’s policies for the most part, however there were several disagreements and issues of contention during the policies of perestroika and glasnost.
 * Document:



Source: Dale R. Herspring, “Gorbachev and the Soviet Military”,Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 4, Soviet Foreign Policy 1987, pp. 42-53, published by The Academy of Political Science 
 * **How did the Soviet state apply those policies to that group/institution, and what were the effects? **
 * When the Rust Affair occurred in 1987, the incident led to a staunch rebuke of the military by the public, thereby paving the path for personnel changes conducive to Gorbachev’s policy goals. This led to the removal of several military officials and generals who opposed Gorbachev, while replacing them with men who would allow him to conduct his policies: glasnost and perestroika. Since, Gorbachev knew that he could not accomplish his foreign policy goals without the military on his side, he was able to do this by replacing powerful leaders in the military with men who would allow him to pursue his ideas. Gorbachev’s process of implementing perestroika was done by trying to restructure the way the military was being used in all parts of the party through “the adoption of a public stance toward the defense budget that suggests that the military will have to do more with less spending”. Gorbachev’s process of implementing glasnost was designed to occasion an exchange of opinions and ideas which was in the best interests of the leadership. By casting the activities, Soviet military reforms believed that public openness would assist in correcting some of the army’s discipline and morale problems. As a result, by the end of 1989 Gorbachev had ordered to decommission 500,000 men from the Society army, significantly reducing the Soviet military in the Eastern Europe. However, as we will see later, this significantly affected the Soviet Union’s ability to concentrate power in Eastern Europe.
 * <span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">Document:

<span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">Source: Edward A. Corcoran, a retired military officer who holds a Ph.D. in comparative government from Columbia University, Perestroika and the Soviet Military: Implications For U.S. Policy, //Policy Analysis//, Cato Policy Analysis No. 133, May 29 1990 "Gorbachev's analysis is essentially correct--the Soviets no longer have the option of being a military superpower and threatening to conquer the West. In the post-war period, they expended their limited resources in military efforts and used the coercive basis of their society to protect the privileged position of the elite. That has brought Soviet society to the brink of economic ruin. The badly outmoded Soviet industrial sector can no longer support an overgrown military machine. Nor can it maintain the already low civilian standard of living, a failure that threatens to produce an explosive public reaction. Modernization is imperative, and the needed resources can only come from a drastic cut in military spending. The Soviet economic system has proved to be woefully inadequate. By stifling initiative, it has squandered a large part of its human resources and alienated many citizens, a problem made worse by the subjugation of dozens of non-Russian nationalities. Its visible economic failure has discredited the system in the eyes of both Soviet citizens and the world--other nations no longer desire to follow the Soviet model. Gorbachev has been trying to salvage what he can, protecting his own position and that of his colleagues while trying to move his nation forward. Given the size and complexity of the problems he faces, that may well be the biggest task that a leader has ever faced. He has been forcing his nation to face the task ahead by making the road backward too difficult, particularly by dismantling the systems of controls in Eastern Europe and the monopoly on information and discussion at home.”
 * **<span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">What was the significance of Gorbachev’s reforms as it pertained to that group/institution? **
 * <span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">Gorbachev was able to successfully interconnect his program of economic restructuring and need to restructure military policy, which allowed him to be able to control military expenditures and political decisions regarding the military.
 * <span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">Gorbachev was able to avoid putting the Soviet Union in an arms race versus the U.S., which at the time would have significantly hurt the economy. This as a result, allowed him to increase relations with the U.S. and the West through nuclear accords and arms reduction.
 * <span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">Under the perestroika reforms, the Soviet military power decreased to the point of not being a military super power any more, however this opened a new role to be filled by the economy, which led to a new era of government decision making without focus on the military like before. The Soviet Union had to shift their reliance from their military to their economy. Gorbachev found that changing the way military security was perceived by the public internally and in the East-West relations would help him challenge the debate of the role the military played in society as a whole
 * <span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">Ultimately, these policies would also play a significant role in helping reform the Soviet state through his other policies of uskoreniye and democratizatsiya.
 * <span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">Document:


 * <span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">Bibliography **
 * <span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; line-height: 1.5;">Corcoran, Edward A. "Perestroika and the Soviet Military: Implications For U.S. Policy."Perestroika and the Soviet Military: Implications For U.S. Policy. The Cato Institute, n.d. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa133.html>.
 * <span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; line-height: 1.5;">Herspring, Dale R. "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military." Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 36.4, Soviet Foreign Policy (1987): 42-53. //<span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; line-height: 1.5;">JSTOR //<span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; line-height: 1.5;">. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1173832>.
 * <span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; line-height: 1.5;">Holloway, David. "State, Society, and the Military under Gorbachev." //<span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; line-height: 1.5;">JSTOR //<span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; line-height: 1.5;">. The MIT Press, 1989. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538930?seq=10>.
 * <span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; line-height: 1.5;">Larrabee, F. Stephen. "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military." Foreign Affairs 66.5 (1988): 1002-026. //<span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; line-height: 1.5;">JSTOR //<span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; line-height: 1.5;">. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043575>.